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Abstract  
The end of the Cold War has not only witnessed the rise of new transnational 
threats such as terrorism, crime, proliferation and civil war; it has also seen the growing 
role of non-state actors in the provision of security in Europe and North America. Two 
concepts in particular have been used to describe these transformations: security 
governance and networks. However, the differences and potential theoretical utility of these 
two concepts for the study of contemporary security have so far been under-examined. This 
article seeks to address this gap. It proposes that security governance can help to explain 
the transformation of Cold War security structures, whereas network analysis is 
particularly useful for understanding the relations and interactions between public and 
private actors in the making and implementation of national and international security 
policies. 
 
If the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have demonstrated one fact, it is that 
the new millennium is not more secure or peaceful than the Cold War era. 
Moreover, they showed that new security threats are able to directly affect distant 
and major powers. While the number of interstate wars has been decreasing, non- 
state threats of terrorism, transnational crime, arms and ethnic conflicts not only 
appear to be proliferating, but also can have serious consequences for the life and 
welfare of individuals around the globe. Governments in Europe and North 
America have been caught largely unprepared for these developments. Following 
the end of the Cold War, many states substantially reduced their military budgets 
and the size of their armed forces. Although there was an awareness of new 
threats from political and economic instability, and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs), they were previously believed to be of limited impact 
beyond their respective regions. This assessment was wrong. In a globalising 
world, the direct and indirect effects of instability and conflict cannot easily be 
contained. The same openness that allows goods, finance and information to flow 
around the globe permits the transfer of WMDs, the coordination of international 
terrorist attacks and the operation of transnational crime. Today many 
governments within the transatlantic region are attempting to redress their 
failure to prepare for asymmetric threats by combining their forces through 
multilateral institutions, drawing on the capabilities of non-state actors, non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) and private military companies and 
adopting new methods of providing security such as network-centric warfare. 
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    Two concepts in particular have gained currency in analysing these changes in 
the nature of contemporary threats and the making and implementation of 
security policies in the transatlantic region: security governance and networks. 
However, the differences and relationship between these concepts have so far 
been under-examined. This article seeks to address this gap. It suggests that while 
the two phenomena are linked, ‘security governance’ typically refers to the 
transformation of security policymaking after the end of the Cold War, whereas 
‘network’ models are primarily concerned with the analysis of the relations and 
interactions between different types of actors in national and international 
relations. What follows is an attempt to clarify the differences between these two 
emerging theories and to outline how each can be employed to enhance our 
understanding of contemporary security. 
 
The Changing Nature of Transatlantic Security 
Before one can turn to an assessment of the content, differences and potential 
theoretical utility of security governance and network approaches with regard to 
the analysis of transatlantic security, it is necessary to examine why we should 
require new theoretical models in the first place. To make this case, this section 
examines key changes in the nature of national and international security 
policymaking which appear to be outside the scope of theoretical models that 
became prominent under the different and historically contingent empirical 
conditions of the Cold War. In particular, this section describes three 
transformations in Europe and North America: the rise of non-state security 
threats, the proliferation of non-state security actors and the emergence of new 
forms of coordination. It then proceeds to analyse how these empirical 
developments challenge traditional conceptions of national and international 
security and how they have contributed to the rise of security governance and 
networks as new theoretical lenses. 
 
New Security Threats 
The first and perhaps most important challenge to traditional theorising during 
the past decade and a half has been the transformation of the threat environment 
following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. This 
applies in particular to Europe and North America, which are the primary focus of 
this article, but its consequences can also be observed in the rest of the world. Non- 
state threats such as civil war, terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs have 
replaced the threat from proxy wars, nuclear annihilation or a third world war 
between the two superpowers and their alliances. Partly, the rise of non-state 
threats as security concerns is the result of the end of the superpower 
confrontation and the re-emergence of previous suppressed conflicts in the Third 
World. And partly it reflects the effects of globalisation and the growing 
integration of societies. While civil wars have outstripped interstate conflicts as 
the major cause of casualties for decades, it seems that governments and 
international organisations in the transatlantic region have become increasingly 
sensitive to the former. This is because today’s global economy contains internal or 
regional wars that can have immediate and serious consequences for states 
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around the world. These consequences can range from the flood of refugees to 
rising prices for essential commodities such as oil or minerals. Other threats such 
as global terrorism and transnational crime have been created by the increasing 
level of international interaction, which has been one of the defining 
characteristics of globalisation (Held and McGrew 2002, 6). 
    As academics debated the utility of broadening and deepening the concept of 
security from military to non-military threats and from states to individuals 
(Ullman 1983; Walt 1991; Rothschild 1995; Baldwin 1997; Krause and Williams 
1997), the threat perception of governments and international organisations in the 
transatlantic region radically changed following the end of the Cold War and, 
more recently, following 11 September 2001. The development of threat perception 
in the United Kingdom is representative of the shift from state to non-state threats 
in Europe and North America. In 1998, the government of the United Kingdom 
(UK) stated in its strategic review that the clear confrontation of the Cold War had 
been replaced by a ‘complex mixture of uncertainty and instability’ (Ministry of 
Defence[MoD] 1998, para. 2). It concluded that the foremost threats to the UK in 
this complex mixture were internal conflicts such as in the former Yugoslavia, 
followed by rogue regimes, the proliferation of WMDs and asymmetrical threats 
such as drug trafficking, organised crime, terrorism, environmental degradation 
and attacks on information technology (MoD 1998, para. 41). A direct attack on the 
UK homeland by another state was virtually ruled out by the review. Instead, 
especially after the events of 11 September 2001, the UK government has focused 
on non-state threats. In its 2003 Defence White Paper, the UK Ministry of Defence 
concluded: ‘There is currently no major conventional threat to Europe, but 
asymmetric forms of attack, including from international terrorism, pose a very 
real threat to our homelands’ (MoD 2003, 5). Similarly, the French Ministry of 
Defence has proclaimed that ‘the main threat to the survival of the French nation 
has disappeared, probably for a long time. However, the risks related to 
proliferation and dispersal of weapons of mass destruction have multiplied and 
they weigh diffusely and insidiously on our strategic environment.’1 And the 
German Ministry of Defence announced in its recent Defence Policy Guidelines, 
‘At present, and in the foreseeable future, there is no conventional threat to the 
German territory.’2 In place of the threat of conventional war which dominated 
the Cold War era, the new threats faced in the transatlantic region do not challenge 
the territorial integrity of states, but rather the European and North American 
‘way of life’ (Clarke 1998), including the security of citizens and the stability of 
their economies. In the new millennium, governments and international 
organisations in Europe and North America are thus perceiving national and 
international security progressively in broader and more complex terms than they 
did during the Cold War. 
 
 
New Actors 
The second challenge to traditional theoretical conceptions is the proliferation and 
growing role of non-state actors in national and international security. At the same 
time as governments and international organisations have shifted their primary 
   
1       See khttp://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/def_natio/index-a.htmll. 
2       See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2003). 
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security concerns from interstate war to asymmetric threats, limited resources, 
lack of expertise in non-traditional areas of security, and divergent interests 
among governments have facilitated a growing fragmentation of security 
policymaking. In addition to states, we can today observe a growing number of 
international institutions and private actors, ranging from non-governmental 
organisations to private security companies, engaged in security. These actors do 
not only influence the decision-making process with regard to national and 
international security concerns; they are also progressively involved in the 
implementation of public and private security policies. 
    This is not to argue that states are in the process of being replaced by non-state 
actors in contemporary security. National governments remain key players as the 
members of international organisations, NGO donors and employers of private 
military companies. In fact, it can be argued that the growing role of non-state 
actors has, to some degree, been the result of governmental policies designed to 
deal with transnational security issues and to decrease the public burden for the 
provision of security. 
    The increasing prevalence of non-state actors in national and international 
security rests in particular on four factors: number, scope, expertise and resources. 
The number and scope of international regimes and organisations have grown 
significantly since the end of the Cold War, which had created obstacles to 
cooperation. New international regimes include among others the Chemical 
Weapons Convention; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; and the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (SIPRI 2003, 764-88). Moreover, the 
membership and functions of existing multilateral organisations such as NATO, 
the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) have been increasing. Similarly, there has been a proliferation of NGOs 
engaged in the provision of security, including conflict management, refugee 
resettlement and humanitarian aid (Minear et al. 2000; Gordenker and 
Weiss 1996). The emergence of a private military service industry can be 
viewed as the latest outcome of the progressive fragmentation of security 
policymaking among state and non-state actors in the post-Cold War era 
(Edmonds 1998; Fredland and Kendry 1998). It is illustrated by the progressive 
use of private military companies in the recent intervention in Iraq. According to 
Deborah Avant (2004, 153), the ratio of private military contractors to soldiers has 
increased from one in fifty during the first Gulf War in 1991 to one in ten during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. As governments come under increasing strain due to 
the growing number and complexity of contemporary security threats and due to 
the rising cost of national and international defence, non-state actors can offer 
additional resources and expertise. Moreover, multilateral institutions allow 
nation-states to address transnational security threats that otherwise appear to be 
out of their reach. 
 
 
New Forms of Coordination 
A third challenge to theorising in security studies has been rise of networked 
modes of coordination among new security threats and among the multiplicity of 
state and non-state actors that seek to address them. The ‘dark networks’ 
(Raab and Milward 2003) that define contemporary security threats such as 
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transnational terrorism, global crime and weapons proliferation are not only able 
to coordinate the resources and actions of criminal actors across national 
boundaries, but are also particularly suited for evading national defence 
mechanisms developed during an era that was focused on superpower conflict 
(Williams 1998, 156; Kenney 2005, 70; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b, 1). 
    However, the proliferation of networked forms of coordination is not only 
characteristic of post-Cold-War security threats. In order to effectively respond to 
these new security challenges, national and international security providers are 
increasingly employing networks themselves. This shift towards networked 
modes of coordination ranges from the internal restructuring of government 
agencies to the creation of formal and informal linkages among public and private 
actors. The US military, for instance, has developed the doctrine of ‘network- 
centric warfare’, which seeks to use advances in information technology to create 
direct linkages among military units, thus increasing the speed of command and 
enabling self-synchronising actions (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998). Other 
networks have been developing among public and private actors within and 
among nation-states. Thus William Waugh and Richard Sylves argue that the 
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks was effectively managed through a 
network of US agencies, private arms, NGOs and private volunteers (Waugh and 
Sylves 2002, 148). And in Europe there have been numerous efforts to establish 
collaborative networks among the national armed forces of EU member states and 
to institutionalise formal and informal interfaces between international 
organisations and non-governmental actors operating in conflict regions (Borchert 
and Rummel 2004). Even globally, there appears to be increasing evidence for the 
emergence of multilateral inter-governmental and non-governmental networks 
dealing with issues such as money laundering, freezing terrorist assets and 
sharing vital information (Slaughter 2004, 159). 
 
 
Theoretical Challenges 
The transformation of national and international security in Europe and North 
America has been widely recognised (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Pugh 2002; 
Duffield 2001). However, international relations theory is still in the process of 
coming to grips with the changes outlined above. In particular, theorising about 
national and international security has to respond to two challenges. The first 
regards the underlying premises of key theoretical approaches in security studies, 
such as neorealism, regime theory and security communities. Specifically, 
contrary to the empirical observations presented in the preceding sections, these 
theories are based on the assumption that states are the primary source of 
insecurity to each other and that they are also the sole actors worthy of 
consideration that provide for national and international security. Thus, similarly 
to neorealism (Waltz 1979), the analysis of security regimes has typically been 
placed within the context of a ‘security dilemma’ among states (Jervis 1982, 358; 
Stein 1982, 300). Moreover, even the study of security communities, which 
suggests that ‘because of shared democratic norms and identities . . . [the members 
of the Atlantic Alliance] did not perceive each other as threats with the end of the 
Cold War’(Williams and Neumann 2000, 358; also Adler and Barnett 1998, 47), 
appears to imply that, in the absence of these conditions, states within the 
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transatlantic region would view each other as security threats. In addition, all 
three theoretical approaches are based on the assumption that national and 
international security is mostly a result of the relations among states-even if, in 
the case of security communities, a common identity and trust might also be 
forged through non-governmental contacts (Adler and Barnett 1998, 38). 
    What is crucial about the discrepancies between these core assumptions and 
the post-Cold-War security environment in the transatlantic region is not so much 
the question whether the discrepancies invalidate these theories. More important 
is that these assumptions impede the theoretical exploration of alternative 
conditions and their implications for contemporary security. They have directed 
the above theories to focus on the question of how states can coexist and cooperate 
peacefully given the threat that they pose to each other (Hasenclever et al. 1996, 
177), whereas the theoretical examination of how security would be provided 
within a system that is predominantly characterised by non-state security threats, 
multiple public and private security providers, and networked modes of 
coordination has been neglected. 
    The second challenge involves the emergence of new questions that are not 
sufficiently addressed by existing theoretical approaches, such as: What are the 
consequences of the fragmentation of security policymaking among state and 
non-state actors for policies, their implementation and their effect on the level of 
security’ Who dominates contemporary security governance arrangements and 
why’ And what are the conditions for the effective and efficient functioning of 
networked modes of coordination in security’ 
    In response to these challenges, two theoretical frameworks have gained 
increasing currency among scholars of national and international security:                               ¨ 
security governance and network analysis (Hanggi 2003; Kirchner 2003; 
Krahmann 2003b; Raab and Milward 2003; Dillon and Reid 2001; Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt 2001a). The following sections examine how these two approaches may 
help to answer these questions and thus improve our understanding of 
contemporary national and international security. 
 
 
Security Governance and Networks: Similarities and Differences 
The proposition that security governance and network analysis might be suitable 
approaches for answering the questions raised above rests on their ability to 
model the transformations of national and international security policies in 
Europe and North America. Specifically, both approaches are gaining prominence 
because they permit an analysis of security policymaking that includes state and 
non-state actors linked through a mixture of hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
modes of cooperation. However, the respective theoretical utility of these two 
approaches, their differences and their relationship have so far been little 
explored. These tasks are particularly important because of the similarities 
between the two concepts. 
    In terms of definition, security governance has been related to the emergence 
‘structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to 
coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and 
implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political 
authority’ (Krahmann 2003b, 11). Whereas networks in security policy have been 
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linked to the fact that ‘power is migrating to non-state actors, because they are able 
to organise into multi-organisational networks . . . more readily than can 
traditional, hierarchical, state actors’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b, 1). Both 
concepts thus appear to refer to the same phenomena: security policymaking 
arrangements and processes in which state and non-state actors increasingly 
cooperate through horizontal as well as hierarchical relationships among each 
other. 
    The differences between these two concepts only become apparent in a closer 
reading of the existing literature on global and security governance and networks 
in contemporary security policymaking. It can thus be argued that global and 
security governance has mainly been concerned with the transformation of 
security policymaking, whereas the notion of networks has been predominantly 
applied to understanding the relations and interactions within and between 
public and private organisations at different levels. At the same time, the rise of 
security governance and networks appears to be connected in that the fragmented 
governance arrangements facilitates, or perhaps even requires, the adoption of 
networked forms of coordination among state and non-state actors. 
    In addition, it can be suggested that governance and network analysis as 
theoretical frameworks rather than descriptive terms have been concerned with 
distinct, but overlapping, sets of questions. The literature on global and security 
governance largely seeks to describe and analyse historical and institutional 
change in international relations and its consequences. David Held and Anthony 
McGrew (2002, 1) thus contend, ‘Any discussion of global governance must start 
with an understanding of the changing fabric of international society.’ Similarly, 
Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (1999, 3) argue that ‘the question of global 
change, its sources and its implications, [is] the pre-eminent issue in international 
relations theorising . . . [G]lobal governance theory has emerged as a key vantage 
point on this central question of our times’. 
    The changes that have been observed in the governance literature are to some 
degree based on the three transformations outlined in this article, but they also 
include shifts in the influence of public and private actors, the proliferation of new 
institutions and the development of new policies as consequences of the 
fragmentation of authority among a growing range of actors. In addition, many 
studies are concerned with the practical problems and normative implications 
arising from the emergence of global and security governance, ranging from 
questions of effectiveness and efficiency to the lack of democratic accountability 
and legitimacy (Government and Opposition 2004). 
    Network analysis, on the other hand, has primarily been concerned with 
questions such as: Who are the most powerful or central actors within particular 
governance arrangements’ How do relations between actors influence their 
interactions’ How are network structures related to particular outcomes’ 
According to Peter Klerks (2002, 53), ‘[s]ocial network mapping can show what 
material resources someone can mobilize and which information he has access to. 
It can also introduce dynamics into the rigid and ‘frozen’ understanding of social 
structures.’ Network analysis has been applied both to the analysis of threats and 
to policymaking. In addition, network, like governance, analysis investigates the 
conditions under which policy outcomes meet normative and efficiency criteria. 
Thus Anthony Dekker (2002, 94; see also Raab and Milward 2003, 414) argues in 
his study of networks within the military that the ‘most important goal of social 
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network analysis is to make recommendations to improve communication and 
workflow in an organisation’ based on its insights into the relationships between 
actors and their impact on information or coordination processes. It is here that the 
congruence between the analysis of global and security governance and networks 
is perhaps strongest. 
    In order to distinguish the two approaches, their respective scope and 
hypotheses, the following sections propose that the concept of security 
governance might best be employed as a theory for the explanation of the 
transformation from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ and the possible systemic 
consequences of this development for national and international security. 
Network approaches appear to offer valuable insights into the structure and 
function of the multiple, diverse and frequently overlapping control and 
coordination arrangements that together make up global and security governance 
(Rosenau 1995, 16). At the same time, insights from both explanatory models 
contribute to the normative assessment of the shift from government to 
governance and different types of networked coordination. 
 
 
Security Governance 
So far research on global and security governance has largely taken a descriptive- 
analytical approach to understanding the growing fragmentation of policymaking 
among states, international organisations and private actors as part of a shift from 
centralised, state-centric ‘government’ to fragmented, multilateral ‘governance’ 
(Kirchner 2003; Webber et al. 2004). However, an increasing number of demands 
have been made to formulate insights gathered from empirical studies into 
theoretical propositions designed to explain the emergence of global and security 
governance and hypothesise about its implications for international relations in 
the new millennium. This section outlines how the concept of security governance 
might be used to theoretically explain the transformation of security and its 
implications. 
    While national, regional and global governance have been defined as the 
fragmentation of political coordination in different dimensions, including 
geography, function, resource distribution, interests, norms, decision-making 
and policy implementation (Krahmann 2003c), the concept of security governance 
applies this definition to the changing structures and processes that characterise 
national and international security. It suggests, among other aspects, that 
contemporary security policymaking and implementation are not the exclusive 
sphere of nation-states, but increasingly extend beyond national borders; that they 
are structured along functional lines; and that they involve non-state actors such 
as international institutions, NGOs and private companies. 
    As a theoretical concept, security governance rests on several premises 
concerning the nature of contemporary international relations, which are very 
different from those discussed earlier in this article. The first premise, which is 
supported by the empirical findings presented in the preceding sections, contends 
that interstate war has been replaced with non-state and intrastate threats such as 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons and civil conflicts as the most important 
source of insecurity in Europe and North America (Thomas 2000, 161-62; 
Rosenau 1992, 3; Tuathail et al. 1998, 12). The second, related premise is that the 
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multiplicity, complexity and internal or transnational nature of contemporary 
security threats are challenging the ability of sovereign nation-states to ensure the 
security of their citizens (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b, 1). Since the new threats are 
able to transgress national boundaries, states within the transatlantic region are 
increasingly required to cooperate or draw on non-state actors such as 
international organisations to combat them. This leads to the third premise, 
which suggests that the state’s exclusive provision of national and international 
security, which characterised Europe and North America during the Cold War, is 
increasingly being eroded and that the norm of the state monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force is being replaced by considerations of efficiency and cost- 
effectiveness (Markusen 2003, 473; Pint et al. 2001). 
    Several interrelated hypotheses might be proposed on the basis of these 
premises, which can help to explain the emergence of security governance in 
Europe and North America. The first hypothesis regards the effects of the 
changing nature of contemporary threats on the provision of security. It proposes 
that if governments are no longer primarily concerned with threats from other 
states, but rather are concerned with threats from non-state actors, and if the threat 
to the existence and territory of the state has been replaced by that to the security 
of citizens and the stability of the economy, governments not only face the need to 
cooperate with other state and non-state actors but also are increasingly free to do 
so. Security governance thus helps to explain the proliferation of transnational 
cooperation and institutions among both state and non-state actors in the post- 
Cold-War era as outlined above. 
    However, security governance does not imply that this development requires 
the unifying efforts of a hegemonic power or that it will lead to further integration. 
Conversely, security governance hypothesises that the decreased threat from 
interstate war permits cooperation to proceed within more flexible ‘coalitions of 
the willing’. One reason for this development is that in the post-Cold-War era 
smaller and changeable alliances are no longer perceived as disturbing a 
precarious balance of power within Europe. Another is that coalitions of the 
willing are more suited to accommodate the complex and regionally differentiated 
impact of asymmetric security threats. 
    Unlike the unifying threat of the Warsaw Pact, the new threats such as 
terrorism and transnational crime are more likely to affect the security and 
interests of states in the transatlantic region to different degrees. Coalitions of 
the willing are able to reflect these differences by allowing cooperation among 
state and non-state actors in response to specific threats or local crises. Moreover, 
due to the fragmented and diverse nature of the new security threats, existing 
alliances and organisations are likely to increasingly develop structures, such as 
NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces, which permit internal coalitions of the 
willing, allowing members to cooperate without the direct involvement of others 
(Bensahel 1999; Stuart 2004). 
    Third, security governance proposes that the complexity of the new threats, 
the weakening of the state monopoly on the provision of security and the rise of 
cost-efficiency as a legitimising mechanism promote geographical and functional 
specialisation among state and non-state actors in order to reduce the cost of 
providing national and international security. In particular in Europe, govern- 
ments thus increasingly recognise the advantages of ‘role sharing’ through 
developing specialised military units, which they can contribute to international 
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peacekeeping operations (NATO 2002). Other attempts at specialisation include 
United Nations subcontracting missions to regional organisations or NGOs 
(Knight 1996). 
    But how is the emergence of security governance linked to the growth of 
networked forms of coordination’ As has been outlined by Mette Eilstrup 
Sangiovanni in this issue, networks are particularly suited for accommodating the 
above developments, for several reasons. First, due to the inclusion and frequent 
dominance of informal relations, networks are relatively flexible and can adapt 
comparatively quickly and easily to new actors or demands. While formal 
institutional linkages require considerable time and resources in order to be 
established in national law or international regimes, informal relations can be set 
up instantaneously among actors that have an interest in an exchange or 
collaboration on a particular security issue. New actors can enter these relations 
on the basis of their capabilities and open channels of communication. New issues 
or problems can be responded to by the formation of new networks among 
affected actors or the transformation of existing networks in order to enlarge their 
scope or capabilities. Networks are thus especially fitting for coordination among 
state and non-state actors in complex humanitarian emergencies or intergovern- 
mental cooperation in flexible coalitions of the willing. 
    Second, with their informal and horizontal relations, networks can stretch 
more easily than formal hierarchical structures across national boundaries and 
sovereignties (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Networks are thus particularly adept at 
addressing transnational security threats and issues such as managing refugee 
flows and monitoring the proliferation of WMDs. 
    Third, through decentralisation, networks promote geographical and func- 
tional specialisation through subsidiaries, i.e. the making and implementation of 
policies by those who are affected (Knight 1996, 47). Networks can thereby 
encourage the development of differentiated solutions for a complex world rather 
than the imposition of centrally directed, uniform policies. Moreover, networks 
can foster the use of local knowledge and resources, which benefits the long-term 
advancement of affected communities. Drawing on local groups, personnel and 
assets is frequently more cost-efficient than using centralised capabilities. 
    This is not to suggest that networks are generally more efficient and effective 
than traditional modes of coordination in national and international security, or to 
argue that the emergence of networks or security governance occurs without 
problems. In particular, questions of transparency, accountability and legitimacy 
in governance and networking are being discussed in a growing range of research 
(Government and Opposition, 2004; van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004). 
    While the emergence of security governance might contribute to explaining 
the proliferation of networks as a mode of coordination, and some if its 
implications, the preceding theoretical model fails to illustrate how coordination 
proceeds within particular governance arrangements. Network analysis has 
proposed some answers to this question. 
 
 
Network Analysis 
Like global and security governance, network analysis began its life as a 
descriptive-analytic concept rather than a theoretical approach (Dowding 1995). 
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Since the 1990s, however, a number of network models has been developed that 
help to answer key questions such as: Who dominates particular networks and 
why’ How do networks influence the processes and outcomes of formal and 
informal coordination among different types of actors’ And what are the 
conditions for the effective functioning of networks’ Since it is beyond the scope 
of this article to discuss all of these in detail,
4 
the following will focus primarily on 
social network approaches that have been applied to national and international 
security and offer testable hypotheses. 
    In general, networks have been defined as sets of actors that share an interest in 
a specific issue area and are linked to each other through stable formal or informal 
relations (Atkinson and Coleman 1992). In the study of security, network analysis 
has predominantly been concerned with the linkages among terrorist and criminal 
networks (Baker and Faulkner 1993; Krebs 2002; Raab and Milward 2003; Williams 
2001), the development of network-centric warfare (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998; 
Dekker 2002) and relations among public and private foreign and security 
policymakers (Krahmann 2003a). These networks allow for a mixture of linkages 
ranging from hierarchical to horizontal (Kenis and Schneider 1991, 42) and are 
based, among other things, on the exchange of information, resources, support or 
commitments (Raab and Milward 2003, 417; Williams 1998, 155). 
    The basic premise of all network analyses is that, in addition to the character, 
beliefs and interests of actors, the relations among a set of actors have a major 
impact on the ways in which they interact and on the outcomes of these 
interactions, be they preferences, policies or resource exchanges (Borzel 1998, 258). 
However, there are multiple ways in which network structures have been defined 
and measured. Social network analysis has been based on a number of factors, 
including the strength, number and distribution of the relations among sets of 
actors or ‘nodes’. Depending on the purpose of the network, the strength of these 
relations can be measured in terms of frequency of contact and communication 
(van Meter 2002), length of contact and the nature of transactions (Krebs 2002, 44), 
the character of communication (Klerks 2002, 61), direct contact and joint 
attendance of meetings (Baker and Faulkner 1993, 847), and institutional linkages 
and resource dependencies (Krahmann 2003a, 24 ’26). 
    Frequently, the analysis of these measures is based on questioning the actors 
involved in a network. This not only offers an accurate assessment of the network 
structure as it is viewed by its members, but also helps to delineate the boundaries 
of a network, since actors are asked to give complete information about the extent 
of their linkages with other actors. However, some networks such as transnational 
crime cartels and the al Qaeda terrorist network can only be mapped through 
witness accounts in courts or newspaper sources (Krebs 2002, 43; Klerks 2002, 57; 
Baker and Faulkner 1993, 846). Others ‘in particular, networks among 
governments and international organisations’ lend themselves to the analysis 
of formal and information institutional relations as well as resource dependencies 
(Krahmann 2003a, 24-26). 
    Based on the structure of a particular network, social network analyses 
propose a number of related hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the 
centrality or position of a particular actor within a network determines his or her 
ability to interact with and in’uence the notions of other members. Measures of 
  
  4      For an overview of network approaches see van Waarden (1992). 
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centrality include degree, i.e. the number of direct links an actor has with other 
members; betweenness, i.e. the ability of an actor to link to important 
constituencies; and closeness, i.e. an actor’s ability to see what is happening 
within the network (Krebs 2002, 48; Baker and Faulkner 1993, 846). Social 
network analysis distinguishes between two main positions: core and periphery. 
However, there are also distinct positions such as ‘gatekeepers’ who are able to 
link different sections of a network (van Meter 2002, 69). The centrality is at once 
a measure of the power of an actor and his or her vulnerability. Thus, the study 
of terrorist networks suggests that centrality enhances actors’ information and 
control over a network. However, central actors are more easily identified and 
targeted (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b, 9). Similarly, in the making of foreign and 
security policies, central actors can be subject to political pressure from a larger 
number of actors, yet they can also exert pressure across a wider range 
(Krahmann 2003a, 39). 
    The second hypothesis is that the structure of a network plays an important 
role in shaping processes and outcomes. On the one hand, centralised networks 
permit efficient coordination and exchange of resources, since most actors are able 
to contact each other or a central core that distributes information. This is 
illustrated by the development of network-centric warfare which builds on a 
combination of networked forms of coordination with advanced computer 
technology in order to enhance real-time information exchanges among 
geographically dispersed and functionally differentiated military units (Alberts 
et al. 2000, 88). Specifically, network-centric warfare enables actors to ‘self- 
synchronise’ (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998) or ‘swarm’ the enemy simultaneously 
from different directions (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001c, 368). 
    However, self-synchronisation and swarming rest on a commonality of 
interests and objectives (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b, 9) which cannot necessarily 
be assumed beyond intra-organisational networks. In particular, in networks 
involving different types of actors, for instance armed forces and NGOs, 
coordination is frequently complicated by differences in values and interests 
and may therefore require more direct negotiation (Minear et al. 2000). 
Nevertheless, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (2001b, 5) point to instances 
where inter-organisational self-synchronisation between NGOs and government 
agencies has been successful, such as in the international campaign to ban 
landmines. 
    Decentralised networks, on the other hand, allow transnational terrorist 
groups to limit information flows in order to protect their members (Krebs 2002, 
46); whereas in the making and implementation of security policies they enable 
localised action and autonomy (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b, 9). Moreover, 
temporary linkages are created as short cuts in order to overcome the sluggishness 
of decentralised networks at times of high activity (Krebs 2002, 47). 
    Finally, ‘structural holes’ in networks can help to explain why certain 
interactions and outcomes do not occur (Klerks 2002, 62). In security 
policymaking, they suggest that coalitions of interest may form among sets of 
individuals or organisations whereas other coalitions fail to emerge, and how 
these coalitions help determine policies (Krahmann 2003a, 157). 
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Conclusion 
The transformation of the global security environment in the post-Cold-War era 
has led to a growing demand for new theoretical approaches that reflect the 
changing nature of contemporary security threats and policies and explore their 
implications. Security governance and network analysis aim to provide such 
models. However, so far these two concepts have been primarily used in a 
descriptive-analytical way, leaving their theoretical potential under-explored. 
This article has sought to contribute to clarifying this potential. In particular, it has 
attempted to illustrate why we might need new theoretical approaches for the 
analysis of contemporary security and how security governance and network 
analysis might be employed for this purpose. It has argued that security 
governance seems to be particularly useful for explaining the transformation from 
the centralised security arrangements that characterised much of the last century 
towards a more fragmented provision of security involving states, international 
organisations and a growing range of private actors. Network analysis, on the 
other hand, offers fruitful insights into the decision-making structures and 
processes that have emerged among different types of security providers and non- 
state actors threatening contemporary security. Moreover, network analysis helps 
to answer the question of how the relations among these actors shape the 
outcomes of their coordination with regard both to threats and to the making and 
implementation of security policies. 
    However, like a lot of research this exposition raises as many questions as it 
may answer. In particular, it invites further research into the positive and negative 
consequences of the emergence of security governance and the proliferation of 
networks. Are these structures really more efficient and effective than those which 
dominated during the Cold War era’ What makes them effective’ Moreover, 
are they transparent, accountable and legitimate’ A growing range of research 
is being conducted, especially on the normative consequences of the shift 
from government to governance, as the 2004 special issue of Government 
and Opposition attests. However, we will need to apply these approaches to a 
broader range of empirical studies that, in the case of network analysis, involve 
not only terrorism and transnational crime but also the growing transnational 
networks among state and non-state actors engaged in the provision of security in 
order to find some answers. 
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